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Abstract
The U.S. Energy Information Agency has recently published a report prepared by Petroconsultants,
Inc. that addresses the cost of expanding crude oil production capacity in the Persian Gulf. A study
on this subject is much needed in view of the dwindling supply of data on such costs from this region;
however, this report does not provide any data and does little more than present the consultants'
assumptions. Where those assumptions can be checked against plausible extrapolations of costs
elsewhere, the investment per well is too high and productivity per well is too low. The result is an
overstatement of the needed investment per unit of output.
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This report was prepared for EIA by Petroconsultants Inc (PC). Many government and
private bodies had expressed a wish for "foreign energy supply information." Data on Persian Gulf
costs have indeed dwindled in the last 20 years, and a serious attempt should be made to provide
some.
However, the report contains no information, only the consultants' assumptions, of which a
few can be compared with publicly available data. They show the estimates are much too high, in
some areas by a factor of more than five.
If estimators do not disclose data and methods, there is no way to see and correct mistakes.
A similar 1986 PC report "based on reserves" forecast that a non-OPEC production decline was
"imminent and unstoppable...well before [1990]." [OGJ 1986] In fact, there has been a strong
continuing increase. This whopper, still un-examined and unexplained, does not inspire confidence.
The problem is set by an EIA projection (the "high" in Tables 2 and 7). It has oil production
capacity in six Persian Gulf nations rising from 20.7 million barrels daily (mbd) in 1994 to 36.6 mbd
in 2010, a net increase of 15.9 mbd. The interim output is 158 billion barrels, which equates to 433
mbd.
The resulting capacity loss, which is ignored in the PC report, depends on the aggregate
Persian Gulf decline rate. Assume alternatively a 3 percent or a 9 percent decline rate. The capacity
loss is alternatively 13 mbd or 39 mbd. Either way, replacement exceeds the net growth. Added to
the 16 mbd net increase, we need either 29 or 55 mbd in total.
Instead of trying to estimate the likely range of decline rates, the report makes estimates from
Gulf "reserves." They note (p. 2) that the Gulf reserves-to-production ratio (R/P) is about 83,
uneconomically high. They use a rule of thumb of R/P=20 to estimate developed reserves. This
choice is arbitrary. A commonly used rule of thumb is 15. In the USA, the average is 9, varying
widely among States and subdivisions. The UK R/P is lower.
An R/P ratio is an economic response to physical parameters. Both factors vary everywhere.
PC have not justified detailed calculation from an assumed R/P.
But there is an additional and fatal flaw in doing this for the Persian Gulf We know little
about how the reserves are estimated, and how biased for bargaining or political purposes. Persian
Gulf published reserve numbers are too imprecise and often untrustworthy to permit any calculation
of developed or undeveloped reserves. Reckoning costs from reserves compounds the error.
Elsewhere PC have called Persian Gulf reserve increases "political" and overstated. [Campbell
1995] Their strictures of 1995, and earlier, discredit the method they use in 1996. One need not go
nearly as far as they did then to reject what they do now.
PC do not say what reserve concept they are using. Developed reserves, calculated from data
in the form of Tables B1-B8, have a precise definition, generated by capacity and production. Since
operating costs are mostly fixed, and output declines approximately at a constant percent per year,
the unit operating cost rises until it equals the price. At this "economic limit," production stops.
Then the reserve equals the cumulative output from start to "economic limit." Since the main
variables are inter-related, it is often possible to piece out some missing ones. [Adelman 1989]
PC do not use this concept. Indeed, they violate it. In Table B7, "low case," output is
assumed to decline at 25 percent per year. Using their estimate of "peak production operating
expense per barrel," it follows that halfway through Year 10, the economic limit is reached because
fixed plus variable operating expenses exceed the assumed price of $17. But cumulative output at
9.5 years since the peak is only 65 percent of what they call "field size." If we add half a peak year
as an allowance for pre-peak output, we have still produced only 74 percent of the field. Thus the
reserve is not what is economic to produce, but something else, one-third larger, never explained.
Consider now the estimated investment per well. We are not told how it was reckoned, but
we can do a limited reality check by comparing it with USA data for onshore wells of the same depth.
(Offshore, drilling depth effects are swamped by depth of water, by economies of scale in slots per
platform, and recently the spread of subsea completions.)
Table I. Comparison of Estimated Investment Per Well
INVESTMENT PER WELL
AREA
IRAN:Zagros Tertiary
IRAN:Zagros Mesozoic
IRAQ:Zagros Tertiary
IRAQ:Zagros Mesozoic
IRAQ:Arabian Mesozoic
ABU DHABI: Arabian Mesozoic
Sources:
Well Depth
(th ft)
2.5
6.0
12.5
2.5
6.0
12.5
3.5
4.0
6.5
3.5
4.0
6.5
6.5
10.0
11.0
5.0
7.5
10.0
J.A.S.
Drilling
Cost/Well
(th $)
118
244
1234
118
244
1234
147
159
275
147
159
275
275
767
987
207
409
767
Estimated from
J.A.S.
(th $)
441
913
4614
441
913
4614
551
596
1028
550
595
1029
1029
2867
3691
772
1529
2869
Estimated by
Petroconsultants
(th $)
1920
3160
5520
2040
3310
7550
3150
2460
3100
3150
2460
3100
2720
4370
5640
3080
2990
4350
J.A.S., Joint Association Survey of Drilling Costs 1993. Linear interpolation within depth class.
Estimation of cost excess outside USA, and of non-drilling expenses, see [Adelman 1995].
Table I shows the USA drilling cost per well at each depth given in the PC report. This is raised by
70 percent to allow for non-drilling cost, and then multiplied by 2.2 to allow for the higher costs
outside the USA, with its dense service-supply network. The allowance may be excessive. It is much
higher than a similar one made by DOE. [Adelman 1995, p. 236] Yet the PC estimates are up to
several times as high. Until the discrepancy is explained, it must be called a gross overstatement.
We turn now to output per well. Table II compares the PC assumptions of average well
Table II. Middle East Well Productivity 1994
Petroconsultants National Average
Iran
Iraq (1989)
Abu Dhabi
1682
1372
1603
4111
7275
1693
RATIO
4.4
3.5
1.2
4.6
3.6
1.6
5.7
4.1
3.0
5.7
4.1
3.0
2.6
1.5
1.5
4.0
2.0
1.5
National Average
"Middle East offshore"
Average "mid case"
Average "high"
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
2553
1494
2245
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
2616
5811
Sources:
Petroconsultants, Appendix B. "Information from the eight plays
used is assumed to be representative of the countries addressed
here." (p. 2)
World Oil, August 1995; daily output divided by.total wells.
productivity with average output per well in 1994 (or 1989 for Iraq). The national averages are
higher, yet they are too low. They include all operating wells, most of them declining for years.
Hence they understate the output of newly drilled wells. The PC down-bias in well productivity is
even greater than Table II would suggest.
There is an independent reality check. Table III takes the net capacity increase in several
Table III. M
Net capacity increase, 1990-94, mbd
Aggregate output, 1991-94, mbd
Loss of capacity, mbd
at 3% decline
at 9% decline
Total capacity additions
at 3% decline
at 9% decline
Oil Wells drilled 1991-94
Capacity per well
at 3% decline
at 9% decline
iddle East Well Productivity:
Saudi Arabia Iran
2.45 0.7
39.2 17.0
1.176
3.528
3.626
5.978
567
6391
10536
0.51
1.53
1.21
2.23
218
Sources:
Capacity, Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (compare also Centre for Global Energy Studies, bimonthly
reports).
Output, same sources.
Oil wells drilled, World Oil. NB: In some years, oil wells are not shown separately. If so, they are
estimated from the previous years' ratio of oil wells to all wells.
Persian Gulf countries, from end-1990 to end-1994, and adds to it either 3 percent or 9 percent of
New Wells
UAE
0
11.2
0.336
1.008
0.336
1.008
240
5547 1400
10222 4200
Petroconsultants
the intervening cumulative output. The total capacity increment is then divided by the number of oil
wells drilled in the various countries. As we would expect, even with the assumed low 3 percent
decline rate, the average new well produces more than the average of all wells old and new. With
higher decline rates, estimated productivity of the new wells is much greater. But 9 percent is the
lowest of the 24 decline rates assumed by PC for the eight specimen plays in Appendix B. If we take
the PC decline rates seriously, Persian Gulf new-well productivity is many times their estimates.
Both of these errors-- too high an investment per well, and too low a productivity per well--
impart the same bias: overstating the needed investment per unit of output. This report at best is
based on unsupported estimates for an unrepresentative sample. The information gap remains, all the
worse for the pretense that it has been even partly closed.
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